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THE WAR IN IRAQ AND IMF REFORM 
S. Brock Blomberg* 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 1 2002, I began my work for President Bush as the senior 
economist for international finance at the Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA). "The CEA was established by the Employment Act of 
1946 to provide the President with economic analysis and advice on the 
objective development and implementation of a wide range of domestic 
and international economic policy issues."1 The name "Council" 
sounds as though there are a large stable of economists at the 
President's beck and call. In reality, there are actually only three 
members on the council with eight senior staff specialists like myself. 2 
During my year of service, the CEA was given less attention by the 
Administration than was merited by our small size. The purpose of this 
essay is to explain how good intentions and good international policy 
are sometimes sacrificed for strategic interests. But mainly, I provide 
my (largely unheeded) advice on IMF reform. 
Let me begin by providing some background on the good 
intentions of the administration prior to my arrival. On July 17, 2001, 
President Bush urged reform of the International Financial Institutions 
(IFI) including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and other development banks, by calling for "compassionate 
conservatism at an international level. "3 One way to make the world 
more stable and just, he said, was "to work in true partnership with 
developing countries to help them overcome obstacles to their 
development, such as illiteracy, disease, and unsustainable debt. ,,,i 
The backbone of this call to reform came from a Congressional 
commission headed by Allan H. Meltzer, of Carnegie Mellon 
University, which provided a long list of recommendations early in 
2000.5 The Meltzer Commission showed that, among other things, the 
* Professor of Economics, Claremont McKenna College. 
1. White House, Council of Economic Advisors, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea (last visited May 26, 2004). 
2. Id. 
3. U.S. Dept. of State, Radio Address to the Nation (July 21, 2001) available at 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2001/4188.htm (last visited May 26, 2004). 
4. Id. 
5. Statement of Allan H. Meltzer on the Report of the International Financial Institution 
Advisory Commission (mar. 9, 2000), available at 
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IMF is largely failing in its mission to address economic stability. 6 
However, the Commission unanimously supported a proposal 
maintaininf that the IMF continues to restrict short-term crises 
assistance. Why limit IMF assistance? Since the IMF provides funds 
to countries in need, the expectation of such assistance creates moral 
hazard or incentives that encourage reckless behavior and bad policies 
for countries. In other words, countries may not make necessary 
economic reforms because they believe that the IMF will bail them out 
during difficult times, especially if there is an important strategic 
interest in preventing a country from economic crisis. 
This is not merely a theoretical consideration. Many analysts have 
pointed to the amount and persistence of capital flows to Russia before 
August 1998 as an example of why the IMF needs reform. 8 They argue 
that this financial assistance went to a privileged few without making 
the economy more stable.9 On November 9, 2001, in the United States 
Treasury's Report on Implementation of Recommendations Made by 
the International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission, the 
Administration stated that "higher standards for qualification help 
mitigate potential moral hazard concerns related to the greater assurance 
of the ability to borrow."10 
With this information in mind, I went to Washington believing that 
IMF reform was both beneficial and imminent. I left Washington 
having learned a valuable lesson - sometimes good economic policy is 
sacrificed when the political cost is too great. In the remainder of my 
essay, I lay out strategies for effective IMF reform that were largely 
ignored in the past and conclude with possible reasons why such reform 
was not made. 
THE CASE FOR REFORM 
The IMF is an international organization of 184 member 
http://www.gsia.cmu.edu/afs/andrew/gsia/meltzer/Statement-of-Allan-H.doc (last visited 
May 26, 2004). 
6. See Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, Norton and Company, NY 
2003 .. 
7. Statement of Meltzer Commission report to Congress' Joint Economic Committee, 
available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm. 
8. See generally Michael Mussa, Alexander Suoboda, Jeromin Zettelmyer and Olivier 
Jeanne, "IMF Finance and Development" September 1999, Vol 36: Number 3. 
9. Id. 
10. See U.S. Treasury Office of Public Affairs, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po876.htm. 
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countries. 11 According to its articles of agreement, the purpose of the 
IMF is to promote international monetary cooperation, exchange 
stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster economic growth 
and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial 
assistance to countries to help ease balance of payments adjustment. 12 
While the IMF is chartered to provide funds to encourage stability, 
the track record suggests that international moral hazard may be 
preventing the IMF from achieving its laudable goal. Since 
international risk spiked in the 1990s (see Table 1 ), 106 countries have 
been on IMF programs. Most countries have spent more time in a 
program than not and most countries have been in multiple programs 
despite increasing efforts to impose conditionality (see Figure 1 ). 13 
Increasing Financial Risks since Mid 1980s 
Table 1 
1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 
TheIMF 
Total debt in arrears (bill $)0.14.13.93.03.0 
#Countries in arrears: 14 11 13 27 45 
Top 3/Total Exposure(%) 3036 40 60 53 
The World Bank 
Total debt in arrears (bill $) 0.1 3.82.52.22.4 
# Countries in arrears 1 9 7 78 
The Bigger the Loan, the Harder the Economic Fall 
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that for those countries who received 
large IMF packages, more money did not lead to successful graduation 
from IMF programs. This means that they are the only two countries, 
Korea and Mexico, which received large packages and did not spend a 
11. About the IMF at http://www.imf.org/extemal/about.htm. 
12. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. I, available at 
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited May 26, 2004). 
13. This occurred even as structural conditions imposed on each program increased 
eight fold. 
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large portion of time in an IMF program. 14 [Brazil, Indonesia, and 
Turkey are also exceptions, but are still on an IMF program (censored) 
and so their fate remains to be seen.] Even for Korea and Mexico, it is 
important to note other factors besides the IMF that helped each 
country. For Mexico, the 
U.S. intervention and loan guarantee surely had some affect on the 
outcome. 15 For Korea, Kim Dae Jung's leadership was quintessential 
by moving to reform the bankin~ sector and engage in corporate 
restructuring before he took power. 1 
IMF OPTIMISM LEADS TO OVER EXTENDED CREDIT 
Since 1994, the IMF has announced 20 new large financing 
arrangements and has overestimated the ability to repay in practically 
every case. 17 The IMF either over-estimated GDP growth or under-
estimated inflation, in every case but two. (See Table 1) On average, 
the IMF forecasted growth to be 3 percent higher than the actual 
outcome and forecasted inflation to be 19 percent lower. The bias, or 
degree to which the IMF over-estimated growth or under-estimated 
inflation, is highly related to the size of the package. Formal estimation 
shows that for every $2 billion increase of IMF financing, GDP growth 
is over-estimated by 0.5 percent. 18 Formal estimation also shows that 
this large increase in IMF financing has the estimated effect of a 6 
percent increase on the probability that a country will return for more 
funds later. 19 
14. Figure 1 also demonstrates that Turkey, Indonesia and Brazil are outside the range. 
These cannot statistically be considered successes as it is still too early to determine the 
impact of the program given that the observations are right-censored. More to the point, one 
does not need statistical analysis to motivate the point that Brazil and Turkey are on 
sustainable trajectories. 
15. For example, see Jeff Sachs "Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?" 
Frank Graham Memorial Lecture at Princeton University (April, 1995) , available at 
http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf 
16. For example, Kim Dae Jung met with Chaebols even before taking office to 
encourage restructuring. See Edward Graham, Reforming Korea's Industrial Conglomerates, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 2003. 
17. See figure 3. In every case but Russia '99 and Indonesia '00, the IMF forecast was 
either too high for growth, or too low for inflation. 
18. Admittedly, these regressions may suffer from few degrees of freedom (33) and 
omitted variable bias. Still, it is instructive that the impact of the IMF Loan/Quota on Bias 
is statistically significant at all conventional levels with at-stat of 4.10. 
19. Author's calculation using a simple probit model allowing financing to influence 
the probability of default. 
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IMF OVER-PREDICTS THE ABILITY TO REPAY FUNDS 
The Potential Risks to the U.S. Taxpayer 
In the previous section, I argued that reforming the IMF is 
beneficial for the developing world. In this section, I explain that 
reforming the IMF would be beneficial to the United States as well. To 
better illustrate this point, I provide a primer on IMF accounting and 
then relate the IMF balance sheet to the U.S. balance sheet to 
demonstrate that international moral hazard has an impact on the United 
States. I prove this by showing that the last transfer of wealth from the 
United States to the IMF did not improve the financial well-being of the 
IMF, but may have been a waste of US assets. Finally, I provide a 
menu of options for IMF reform. 
IMF financing works as follows: countries maintain their quota of 
reserves and during balance of payment (BOP) crises, draw on 
resources through purchase-repurchase agreements called "reserve 
tranche positions." The procedure is self-financed because each country 
borrows at a given interest rate and must repay the foreign currency. 20 
Usable IMF assets are roughly $230 billion with outstanding credit of 
$75 billion and precautionary balances, which act as a cushion, of about 
$7 billion.21 Yet, these transactions have little direct impact on the U.S. 
budget. After the initial stock of gold was given to establish the U.S. 
quota, the annual cost to maintaining the quota is actually quite small. 
Therefore, in 2001, the U.S. earned $153 million in interest, but paid 
$201 million in financing and currency adjustments leading to a net 
payment of $4 7 million. 22 
However, this does not mean that U.S. citizens are not liable. 
Previously, the United States made large transfers to the IMF without 
being scored on the budget.23 For example, when the United States 
allocated an additional $17.9 billion to the IMF in 1999, there was also 
20. Administrative costs ($450 million) are shared between creditors and debtors. The 
relative burden of these costs in the early 1980's was 25% to 30% for debtors, whereas 
creditors bore a 70% to 75% burden. These statistics are essentially counter-cyclical, so 
during the heavy growth years of the late 1990's it switched, with a 70% to 75% burden on 
debtors and a 25% to 30% burden on creditors. 
21. IMF balance sheet available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/fin.htm. 
22. See Quarterly Report to Congress on Financial Implications of U.S. Participation in 
the International Monetary Fund, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/reports/feb2002/pdf. 
23. See Congress' Joint Economic Committee Statement, chaired by Jim Saxton, 
March, 1998, available at http://www.house/gov/jec/imf.htm. 
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no direct budget cost.24 U.S. quota subscriptions involve an exchange 
of monetary assets between the Treasury and IMF and are not counted 
as budgetary outlays. There is also an obvious opportunity cost of 
transferring assets to the IMF. However, one might argue that such a 
transfer improved the financial health of the IMF and therefore had no 
net financial impact on United States. 
One way to measure the health of the IMF is to compare its 
financial commitments (liquid liabilities) with available resources (net 
uncommitted resources), termed the liquidity ratio. Figure 4 (see 
Appendix) shows that the current liquidity ratio has fallen from its year 
2000 peak and appears to be headed back to the point when the last 
quota increase occurred. 
Figure 5 also depicts two counterfactuals - one in which there was 
no quota increase and another with a quota increase proportional to 3 
percent per year.25 If quotas had not been increased, the liquidity ratio 
would be practically zero, meaning that the IMF has drained all its 1998 
resources. Under a more reasonable assumption of increasing quotas 
with the general trend of the economy (i.e., 3 percent per year), 
stabilization appears following the Asian and Russian crises, but took a 
tum for the worse in the last two years. It therefore does not appear that 
the quota increase made the IMF more financially sound. 
On the contrary, the IMF employed the quota increase to over-
extend itself to just a few countries, putting it in a precarious position if 
any of these countries default. Figure 5 depicts the results from an 
analogous exercise by looking at liquidity ratio of top indebted 
countries (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey) ignoring all other loans 
and assuming the full amount is drawn. This shows again that quota 
increases have not been used to improve the liquidity of the IMF. 
So, what would happen if a country defaulted on a large loan? 
Credit outstanding, as of February 6, 2003, is roughi>' $75 billion of 
which Argentina, Brazil and Turkey owe $68 billion. 2 The remaining 
24. See S. Res. 2334, 105th Cong. (1999) (enacted). The $17.9 billion consisted of 
$14.5 billion for the United States' quota increase and $3.4 billion for a backup line of credit 
for the fund. One quarter of that $14.5 billion quota increase, or about $3.6 billion, was 
actually transferred to the IMF and the rest was put in a letter of credit, which the IMF could 
draw on as needed. 
25. For each case, I assume size does not matter and therefore the amount borrowed is 
unaffected by the size of the quotas. This may be a restrictive assumption, but deriving the 
demand for loans would require similar heroic assumptions. 
26. These three countries have similar loans, with Moody's giving Argentina the lowest 
possible rating of a "Ca" and rating Brazil and Turkey as "Bl," each below what is 
considered "investment grade." Moody's Sovereign Debt Rating, various issues. 
Researchers at Moody's show that a company rated in the C range over five years has a 50% 
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countries have much smaller loans, so precautionary balances are 
sufficient to compensate losses. However, if any of the three larger 
loans went into default, the situation is more troubling as there are no 
sufficient precautionary balances to offset such a default. This is a very 
important area in which the IMF and the United States need reform. 
I believe there are three options to finance a large default. 
The first of these options is to employ the interest-burden sharing 
mechanism. In this scenario, those countries with larger shares would 
have larger burdens.27 A default of $20 billion (i.e., $4 billion less than 
Turkey's profile) would cost the U.S. $2.5 billion over the next five 
years (unless more burden is shifted towards the debtor). The 
challenges are: A) the spread between what a country may receive and 
what a country may charge is limited [tranche rate can be a maximum of 
80% of lending rate]; B) the agreement requires a 70 percent majority 
vote; and C) the burden-sharing mechanism is too severe for debtor 
countries. Hence, there is not enough interest-sharing available to cover 
such a default. 
The second option is to pay for this one-time loss with unused 
capital such as gold. The challenges associated with this option include: 
A) valuing gold as $8 billion on the books when its actual worth is $31 
billion at current market prices, which of course might decline on the 
news of a large sale by IMF. Moreover, drawing down gold reserves is 
a one-time solution unless there is a policy to replenish the gold;28 and 
B) it requires a 70 percent majority agreement. While there is no direct 
cost to the United States, such a large scale sale of gold is unlikely to be 
an acceptable option. 
The third and final option is to tap into the portion of assets that are 
usable, and then require countries to replenish their quotas accordingly. 
The burden would then be directly proportional to their quota share. 
Therefore, the direct cost to the United States would be $5 billion over 
five years. Such action would demonstrate that the $17 .9 billion quota 
increase in 1999 should have been scored on the U.S. budget and should 
change the manner in which IMF is funded. If the United States moved 
to an on-budget facility, accounting for a large loan would depend on 
probability of default and companies in the Bl range have a 25% probability. Both Brazil 
and Argentina have had "Bl" ratings for five years, and Argentina has had "C" range ratings 
for two years. Id. 
27. For example, the US is responsible for about 25% of the creditor cost with the G-7 
totaling about 60%. 
28. This has been done in the past when a trust fund was established for Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) [36 countries totaling $7 billion], and Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) [27 countries totaling $1 billion]. 
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the terms, conditions, and credit rating of the country. Hypothetically, 
an analogously large 10-year loan to a country like Turkey at treasury 
interest rates +200 basis points for first five years, then graduated to 
treasuries +500 basis points with a 4-year grace period would cost the 
United States by slightly over $1 billion using the U.S. government's 
credit-rating methodology. This is the best option, and one that has 
never been considered. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this essay has been two-fold. First, I intended to 
demonstrate that IMF reform is necessary and even provided a menu of 
options on how the United States might encourage such reform when 
financing a large scale default. Second, I intended to provide an 
explanation of why such reform has not occurred and is unlikely to 
occur in the near future. 
Much of economics is about maximizing objectives subject to 
constraints. In the case I have described, the constraint is largely 
political. It is very difficult to mobilize interest in reforming the IMF 
during times of crisis such as the War in Iraq. I believe IMF reform 
requires moving to a system where the cost to the U.S. taxpayer from 
IMF assistance is made transparent. This means that the U.S. taxpayer 
would be made directly responsible for loans made to our allies or loans 
made during war to prevent additional financial crises. If such reform 
were to occur, the U.S. taxpayer would lik~ly discourage lending that 
works at cross-purposes to the strategic goal. Once the War in Iraq 
occurred, any chance at true reform was pre-empted as focus was 
shifted away from such reform, especially because it would make these 
economic costs more transparent to the U.S. taxpayer. To this end, the 
War in Iraq has cast a long shadow on international economic policy. 
So, what has occurred in the place of reform? Countries like 
Argentina continue to suffer as the IMF continues to send mixed 
messages about its seriousness for structural reform. The United States 
taxpayer continues to be liable for non-performing loans by countries 
such as Argentina, but due to the fiction of current U.S. accounting, the 
U.S. is unaware of the risk. Finally, the IMF continues to be in denial 
about its portfolio which is not without risk. 
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Figure 1: 
Most Countries Are on IMF Programs for Majority of Time 1990-Present 
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Figure 3: 
Count~ Date Announced i Biiiions % of IMF Quota Forecast· Actual Growth Forecast- Actual Inflation 
Mexico Feb-95 17.80 689 7.1 -33.0 
Russia Apr-95 5.61 94 -5.0 -47.0 
Thailand Aug-97 3.90 505 3.9 1.9 
Indonesia Nov-97 10.10 490 0.5 -0.3 
Korea Dec-97 21 .00 1938 9.1 1.2 
Russia Jul-98 17.10 306 4.0 -77.7 
Indonesia Aug-98 7.00 337 17.2 -55.7 
Ukraine Sep-98 2.50 182 1.0 0.0 
Brazil Dec-98 18.30 600 -1.8 -17.8 
Mexico Jul-99 2.52 98 -0.7 -11.1 
Russia Jul-99 4.29 72 -5.2 6.6 
Indonesia Feb-00 4.73 225 -1.3 0.5 
Argentina Dec-00 13.70 500 -0.7 -14.0 
Turkey Dec-00 7.50 602 7.1 -53.0 
Turkey May-01 19.00 1556 6.4 -16.0 
Argentina Aug-01 21.70 797 3.2 -1 .8 
Brazil Aug-01 15.60 400 0.7 -1.7 
Turkey Feb-02 16.00 1328 1.1p -12p 
Uruguay Jun-02 2.30 571 8.4p .7p 
Brazil Aug-02 30.00 750 
Average 12.03 602 2.7 -19 
For 22 Recidivist Countries B Credit Rating 
For 14 Non-Recidivist Countries BB- Credit Rating 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5: 
350.0 -
~ I CJ" I ::i 300.0 ~ 
c;; 
u._Q) 
250.0 
:::s 
0 
U) 
Q) -
a:: = 200.0 
"O ;; 
Q) = !: :s E .! 150.0 
E ...J 
0 (,) 
:5 100.0 
a; 
!. 
... 
e 
e 
..... 
50.0 
0.0 .,.-
Figure 2: Factual vs. Counterfactual Possible Liquidity Ratios 
of Top 3 Debtors in IMF 
Increased Quotas by 45 Percent 
t ------·------· .. ·-1 -+-Actual ---1f No Quota Increase in 1999 ::-E!~_9_l!~ Increase Per Yrj 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
11
Blomberg: The War In Iraq And IMF Reform
Published by SURFACE, 2004
